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CONTENTSAbstract 
 
While consumption habits have been utilised as a means of generating a hump shaped 
output response to monetary policy shocks in sticky-price New Keynesian economies, 
there is relatively little analysis of the impact of habits (particularly, external habits) on 
optimal policy. In this paper we consider the implications of external habits for optimal 
monetary policy, when those habits either exist at the level of the aggregate basket of 
consumption goods (‘superficial’ habits) or at the level of individual goods (‘deep’ 
habits: see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)). External habits generate an 
additional distortion in the economy, which implies that the flex-price equilibrium will 
no longer be efficient and that policy faces interesting new trade-offs and potential 
stabilisation biases. Furthermore, the endogenous mark-up behaviour, which emerges 
when habits are deep, can also significantly affect the optimal policy response to 
shocks, as well as dramatically affecting the stabilising properties of standard simple 
rules. 
 
Keywords: consumption habits, nominal inertia, optimal monetary policy 
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July 2009Non-Technical Summary
Within the benchmark New Keynesian analysis of monetary policy (see, for example,
Woodford (2003)), monetary policy typically inﬂuences the economy through the impact
of interest rates on a representative household’s intertemporal consumption decision.
The purely forward-looking consumption dynamics, that such basic intertemporal con-
sumption decisions imply, are unable to capture the hump-shaped output response to
changes in monetary policy one typically ﬁnds in the data. As a means of accounting for
such patterns, some authors have augmented the benchmark model with various forms
of habits eﬀects in consumption. The habits eﬀects can either be internal, whereby
households’ current utility depends on their own aggregate past consumption (see for
example, Fuhrer (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Leith and Mal-
ley (2005)) or external, where instead households’ current utility depends upon other
households’ aggregate past consumption (see, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007)).
The latter, commonly deﬁned as “catching up with Joneses” implies that households
fail to internalise the externality their own consumption causes on the utility of other
households.
More recently, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) oﬀer an alternative form of
habits behaviour, which they label ‘deep’. Deep habits occur at the level of individual
goods rather than at the level of an aggregate consumption basket (‘superﬁcial’ habits).
While this distinction does not aﬀect the dynamic description of aggregate demand
relative to the case of superﬁcial habits, it does render the individual ﬁrms’ pricing
decisions intertemporal and, in the ﬂexible price economy considered by Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2006), can produce a counter-cyclical mark-up which signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the responses of key aggregates to shocks. While the focus of the papers listed
above is on the dynamic response of economies which feature some form of habits, they
do not consider the implications for optimal policy of such an extension.
This paper extends the benchmark sticky-price New Keynesian economy to include
external habits in consumption, where these habits can be either superﬁcial or deep. The
focus on external habits implies that there is an externality associated with ﬂuctuations
in consumption which implies that the ﬂexible price equilibrium will not usually be
eﬃcient, thereby creating an additional trade-oﬀ for policy makers, which may give rise
to additional stabilization biases if policy is constrained to be time consistent. Such
trade-oﬀs will occur whether or not habits are superﬁcial or deep. We also consider the
implications for optimal policy of assuming habits are of the deep kind. In addition to
examining optimal policy, we also consider how the introduction of habits aﬀects the
conduct of policy through simple rules. We ﬁnd that the introduction of deep habits
can induce problems of indeterminacy, as the tightening of monetary policy can induce
inﬂation through variations in mark-up behaviour, such that an interest rate rule which
satisﬁes the Taylor principle (where nominal interest rates rise more than one for one
5
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July 2009with increases in inﬂation above target) may not be suﬃcient to ensure determinacy of
the local equilibrium. We also consider whether or not there is a signiﬁcant role for the
output gap in an optimal simple rule given that our economy contains a major additional
externality beyond that associated with nominal inertia.
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Within the benchmark New Keynesian analysis of monetary policy (see, for example,
Woodford (2003)), monetary policy typically inﬂuences the economy through the impact
of interest rates on a representative household’s intertemporal consumption decision. It
has often been felt that the purely forward-looking consumption dynamics that such ba-
sic intertemporal consumption decisions imply, are unable to capture the hump-shaped
output response to changes in monetary policy one typically ﬁnds in the data. As a
means of accounting for such patterns, some authors have augmented the benchmark
model with various forms of habits eﬀects in consumption. The habits eﬀects can either
be internal (see for example, Fuhrer (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
Leith and Malley (2005)) or external (see, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007))
the latter reﬂe c t i n gac a t c h i n gu pw i t ht h eJ o n e s e se ﬀect whereby households fail to
internalise the externality their own consumption causes on the utility of other house-
holds. Both forms of habits behaviour can help the New Keynesian monetary policy
model capture the persistence found in the data (see, for example Kozicki and Tinsley
(2002)), although the policy implications are likely to be diﬀerent. More recently, Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) oﬀer an alternative form of habits behaviour, which
they label ‘deep’. Deep habits occur at the level of individual goods rather than at the
level of an aggregate consumption basket (‘superﬁcial’ habits). While this distinction
does not aﬀect the dynamic description of aggregate consumption behaviour relative
to the case of superﬁcial habits, it does render the individual ﬁrms’ pricing decisions
intertemporal and, in the ﬂexible price economy considered by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe,
and Uribe (2006), can produce a counter-cyclical mark-up which signiﬁcantly aﬀects the
responses of key aggregates to shocks. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2008)
then extend the analysis of deep habits to a sticky price environment and ﬁnd that such
a model is able to explain, with moderate degrees of price stickiness and plausible policy
rules, the prices puzzle and inﬂation persistence.1
While the focus of the papers listed above is on the dynamic response of economies
which feature some form of habits, they do not consider the implications for optimal
policy of such an extension. In contrast, Amato and Laubach (2004) consider optimal
monetary policy in a sticky-price New Keynesian economy which has been augmented to
include internal (but superﬁcial) habits. Since the form of habits is internal (households
care about their consumption relative to their own past consumption, rather than the
consumption of other households), there is no additional externality associated with
consumption habits themselves, and, given an eﬃcient steady-state, the ﬂexible price
equilibrium in the neighbourhood of that steady-state remains eﬃcient. Accordingly, as
in the benchmark New Keynesian model, there is no trade-oﬀ between output gap and
1It should be noted that Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2008) do not consider the optimal
policy or determinacy issues that are the focus of this paper. We also adopt a diﬀerent mechanism for
introducing nominal inertia which has implications for optimal policy, as discussed below.
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require the introduction of additional ineﬃciencies (such as mark-up shocks or a desire
for interest rate smoothing).
In this paper we extend the benchmark sticky-price New Keynesian economy to
include external habits in consumption, where these habits can be either superﬁcial or
deep. The focus on external habits implies that there is an externality associated with
ﬂuctuations in consumption which implies that the ﬂexible price equilibrium will not
usually be eﬃcient, thereby creating an additional trade-oﬀ for policy makers, which may
give rise to additional stabilisation biases if policy is constrained to be time consistent.
Such trade-oﬀs will occur whether or not habits are superﬁcial or deep. We also consider
the implications for optimal policy of assuming habits are of the deep kind. Here the
ability of policy to inﬂuence the time proﬁle of endogenously determined mark-ups
can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the monetary policy stance and how it diﬀers across discretion
and commitment. In addition to examining optimal policy, we also consider how the
introduction of habits aﬀects the conduct of policy through simple rules. We ﬁnd that
the introduction of deep habits can induce problems of indeterminacy, as the tightening
of monetary policy can induce inﬂation through variations in mark-up behaviour, such
that an interest rate rule which satisﬁes the Taylor principle (where nominal interest
rates rise more than one for one with increases in inﬂation above target) may not be
suﬃcient to ensure determinacy of the local equilibrium. We also consider whether or
not there is a signiﬁcant role for the output gap in an optimal simple rule given that our
economy contains a major additional externality beyond that associated with nominal
inertia.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section we outline our model with deep
and superﬁcial habits. In section 3 we consider optimal policy under both commitment
and discretion, where the policy-maker’s objective function is derived from a second
order approximation to households’ utility. In section 4 we turn to our analysis of
simple rules, considering both their determinacy properties and, for rules which can
ensure determinacy, their ability to mimic optimal policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of households, two monopolistically competitive production
sectors, and the government. There is a continuum of ﬁnal goods that enter the house-
holds’ consumption basket, each ﬁnal good being produced as an aggregate of a contin-
uum of intermediate goods. Households can either form external consumption habits at
the level of each ﬁnal good in their basket, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) call
this type of habits ‘deep’, or they can form habits at the level of the consumption basket
-‘ s u p e r ﬁcial’ habits. Throughout the paper, we use the same terminology. Furthermore,
we assume price inertia at the level of intermediate goods producers. We shall derive a
8
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equations.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure
1. Households derive utility from consumption of a composite good and disutility from
hours spent working.
Deep Habits When habits are of the deep kind, each household’s consumption basket,
Xk















it is household k’s consumption of good i and Cit ≡
R 1
0 Ck
itdk denotes the cross-
sectional average consumption of this good. η is the elasticity of substitution between
habit-adjusted ﬁnal goods (η>1), while the parameter θ measures the degree of external
habit formation in the consumption of each individual good i. Setting θto 0 returns us
to the usual case of no habits.
The composition of the consumption basket is chosen in order to minimize expendi-








t + θCit−1, ∀i







. Aggregating across households yields the total demand






Xt + θCit−1. (1)
Due to the presence of habits, this demand is dynamic in nature, as it depends not
only on current period elements but also on the lagged value of consumption. This, in
turn, will make the pricing/output decisions of the ﬁrms producing these ﬁnal goods,
intertemporal.
Superﬁcial Habits Habits are superﬁcial when they are formed at the level of the ag-
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t , is an aggregate of a continuum of ﬁnal goods

















sectional average of consumption.
Households decide the composition of the consumption basket to minimize expendi-























1−η is the consumer price index. The overall demand for good












U n l i k et h ec a s eo fd e e ph a b i t s ,t h i sd e m a n di snot dynamic and the ﬁnal goods producing
ﬁrms will face a static pricing/output decision.
Remainder of the Household’s Problem The remainder of the household’s prob-
lem is the same irrespective of whether or not habits are deep or superﬁcial. Speciﬁcally,
households choose the habit-adjusted consumption aggregate, Xk
t , hours worked, Nk
t ,
and the portfolio allocation, Dk
























t + Φt − Tt (3)
and the usual transversality condition. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional
on information available at time t, β is the discount factor (0 <β<1),χthe relative
weight on disutility from time spent working, and σ and υ are the inverses of the in-
tertemporal elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and work (σ,υ > 0; σ 6=1 ) .T h e
household’s period-t income includes: wage income from providing labour services to
intermediate goods producing ﬁrms, WtNk
t , dividends from the monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms, Φt, and payments on the portfolio of assets, Dk
t . Financial markets are
10
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are lump-sum taxes collected by the government. In the maximization problem, house-
holds take as given the processes for Ct−1, Wt, Φt,a n dTt,a sw e l la st h ei n i t i a la s s e t
position Dk
−1.





















where wt ≡ Wt
Pt is the real wage (see Appendix A for further details). The Euler equation













t = Et [Qt,t+1] denotes the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate
between periods t and t +1 .
2.2 Firms
In this subsection we consider the behaviour of ﬁrms. These are split into two kinds:
ﬁnal and intermediate goods producing ﬁrms, respectively. In the case of the former,
their behaviour depends upon the form of demand curve they face, which is dynamic in
the case of deep habits, and static under superﬁcial habits. Intermediate goods ﬁrms
produce a diﬀerentiated intermediate good and are subject to nominal inertia in the form
of Calvo (1983) contracts. This structure is adopted for reasons of tractability, allowing
us to easily switch between superﬁcial and deep habits. Additionally, combining optimal
price setting under both Calvo contracts and dynamic demand curves would undermine
the desirable aggregation properties of the Calvo model as each ﬁrm given the signal to
re-set prices would set a diﬀerent price dependent on the level of consumption habits
their product enjoyed relative to other ﬁrms’. By separating the two pricing decisions we
avoid reintroducing the history-dependence in price setting the Calvo set-up is designed
to avoid.2
2In contrast, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2008) employ quadratic price adjustment
costs as in Rotemberg (1982) which allows them to retain the representative ﬁrm ﬁction. However, this
mechanism also removes the price dispersion one observes under Calvo (1983), which is intuitively a
more convincing means of generating costs of inﬂation when analysing optimal policy.
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We assume that ﬁnal goods are produced by monopolistically competitive ﬁr m sa sa n










where ε is the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs in production (ε>1).
Taking as given intermediate goods prices {Pjit}j and subject to the available tech-
nology (5), ﬁrms ﬁrst choose the amount of intermediate inputs {Yjit}j that minimize
production costs
R 1














1−ε is the aggregate of intermediate goods prices in sector i
and represents the nominal marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the ﬁnal
good i.N o m i n a l p r o ﬁts are given by Φit =( Pit − Pm
it )Yit. It is important to note
that this cost-minimisation problem takes the same form whether ﬁrms are faced with
consumers whose habits are deep or superﬁcial. However, their pricing decisions will
diﬀer across this dimension. We now examine the pricing decision of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms,
dependent upon whether habits are deep or superﬁcial.
Deep Habits When habits are deep, ﬁrms face the dynamic demand from households,
given by expression (1), and their proﬁt maximization problem becomes intertemporal:
t h ec h o i c eo fp r i c ea ﬀects market share and future proﬁts. Therefore, ﬁrms choose




Qt,t+sΦit+s, subject to this dynamic demand and the constraint that Cit = Yit.
Qt,t+s is the s-step ahead equivalent of the one-period stochastic discount factor in (4).
The ﬁrst order conditions for Yit and Pit are
vit =( Pit − Pm












where the Lagrange multiplier vit represents the shadow price of producing an addi-
tional unit of the ﬁnal good i. This shadow value equals the marginal beneﬁt of addi-
tional proﬁts, (Pit − Pm
it ), plus the discounted expected payoﬀ from higher future sales,
θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]. Due to the presence of habits in consumption, increasing output by
12
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the absence of habits, when θ =0 , the intertemporal eﬀects of higher output disappear
and the shadow price simply equals time-t proﬁts. The other ﬁrst order condition in
equation (8) says that an increase in price brings additional revenues, Yit,w h i l es i m u l -
taneously causing a decline in demand, given by the term in square brackets and valued
at the shadow value vit.
Superﬁcial Habits Under superﬁcial habits the proﬁt maximization problem of the
ﬁnal goods ﬁrms is the typical static problem whereby ﬁrms choose the price to maximize
current proﬁts, Φit =( Pit − Pm
it )Yit, subject to the demand for their good (2) and under
the restriction that all demand be satisﬁed at the chosen price, Cit = Yit.T h eo p t i m a l
price is set at a constant markup, μ =
η
η−1,o v e rt h em a r g i n a lc o s t ,
Pit = μPm
it .
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods sectors consist of a continuum of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms indexed by j and of measure 1. Each ﬁrm j produces a unique good using only
labour as input in the production process
Yjit = AtNjit. (9)
Total factor productivity, At, aﬀects all ﬁrms symmetrically and follows an exogenous
stationary process, lnAt = ρlnAt−1 + εt, with persistence parameter ρ ∈ (0,1) and






Firms choose the amount of labour that minimizes production costs, (1 − κ)WtNjit.
The subsidy κ, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes, is designed to ensure that the long-run equi-
librium is eﬃcient.3 The minimization problem gives a demand for labour, Njit =
Yjit
Ajit,
and a nominal marginal cost, MCt =( 1− κ) Wt
At , which is the same across ﬁrms. (See
Appendix A for more details.) Nominal proﬁts are expressed as Φjit ≡ (Pjit − MCt)Yjit.
We further assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to the constraints
of Calvo (1983)-contracts such that, with ﬁxed probability (1 − α) in each period, a
ﬁrm can reset its price and with probability α the ﬁrm retains the price of the previous
period. When a ﬁrm can set the price, it does so in order to maximize the present
discounted value of proﬁts, Et
∞ X
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦjit+s, and subject to the demand for its own
good (6) and the constraint that all demand be satisﬁed at the chosen price. Proﬁts are
discounted by the s-step ahead stochastic discount factor Qt,t+s and by the probability
3In this model, all ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive but only intermediate goods producing
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where mct = MCt
Pt is the real marginal cost.
Pm
it represents the price at the level of sector i and is an average of intermediate
goods prices within that sector. With α of ﬁrms keeping last period’s price and (1 − α)












This description of intermediate goods ﬁrms is the same irrespective of the nature of
habits formation.
2.3 The Government
The government collects lump-sum taxes which it rebates to intermediate goods pro-
ducing ﬁrms as subsidies, which ensure an eﬃcient long-run level of output. There is no
government spending per se. The government budget constraint is given by
κWtNt = Tt. (10)
In this cashless economy, monetary policy is conducted in optimal fashion, with
the nominal interest rate being the central bank’s policy instrument. However, we also
consider the consequences of the central bank adopting more simple forms of policy,
such as Taylor-type interest rate rules, and explore how closely these simple policy rules
come to the optimal.
2.4 Equilibrium
In the absence of sector-speciﬁc shocks or other forms of heterogeneity, ﬁnal goods
producers are symmetric and so are households. However, symmetry does not apply
to intermediate goods producers who face randomness in price setting. There is a
distribution of intermediate goods prices and aggregate output is therefore determined
















dj is the measure of price dispersion, which can be shown (see Wood-
ford (2003), Chapter 6) to follow an AR(1) process given by










Note that we have two measures of aggregate prices, a producer price index Pm
t
and the usual consumer price index Pt, and consequently, there will be two measures of





t−1 and πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1. Furthermore, the two inﬂation variables






where μt ≡ Pt
Pm
t is the markup of ﬁnal goods producers. In the presence of deep habits,
this markup is time-varying. The overall markup in the economy is given by the product
of markups in the intermediate goods and ﬁnal goods sectors and equals the inverse of
the real marginal cost, mc−1
t = Pt
MCt. It should be noted that when habits are superﬁcial,
the mark-up in the ﬁnal goods sectors is constant, μt = μ, and there is no longer any
wedge between consumer price and producer price inﬂation.
Finally, the aggregate version of the household’s budget constraint (3) combines with
the government budget constraint (10) and the deﬁnition of aggregate proﬁts (Φt =
PtYt − (1 − κ)WtNt) to obtain the usual aggregate resource constraint,
Yt = Ct. (14)
The equilibrium is then characterized by equations (11) - (14), to which we add
the monetary policy speciﬁcation (to be detailed in Sections 3 and 4 below) and the
following set of equations:
Consumers:











































where : K1t = X−σ
t mctμ−ε






: K2t = X−σ
t μ−ε










lnAt = ρlnAt−1 + εt (24)
Final goods producers:
The diﬀerences in the two economies when habits are deep rather than superﬁcial
emerges in the behaviour of the ﬁnal goods ﬁrms. As noted above, when habits are
superﬁcial they simply adopt a constant mark-up over the price of the bundle of inter-
mediate goods,
μt = μ. (25)
In contrast, when habits are deep and ﬁnal goods ﬁrms face a dynamic demand curve
for their product, the endogenous time varying mark-up is described by the following
two equations (note that we have written the shadow price of producing ﬁnal goods in
















Yt = ηωtXt. (27)
2.5 Solution Method and Model Calibration
In the absence of a closed-form solution, the model’s equilibrium conditions are log-
linearized around the eﬃcient deterministic steady state. The eﬃciency of the steady
state, obtained through the subsidy allocated to intermediate goods producers, allows
us to obtain an accurate expression for welfare involving only second-order terms.
In order to solve the model, we must select numerical values for some key structural
parameters. Table 1 reports our choices, which are similar to those of other studies
using a New Keynesian economy with habits in consumption. The model is calibrated
to a quarterly frequency. We assume zero average inﬂation (π =1 )a n da na n n u a lr e a l
rate of interest of 4%, which together imply a discount factor β of 0.9902.T h e r i s k
aversion parameter σ i ss e ta t2 . 0 ,w h i l eυ equals 0.25,4 and the relative weight on
labour in the utility function χ is assumed to be 3.0. Consistent with the empirical
4υ is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity. While micro estimates of this elasticity are
rather small, they tend not to ﬁt well in macro models. Here, we follow the macroeconomic literature
and choose a larger value of 4.0.
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1.21, split approximately equally between the two monopolistically competitive sectors







, and depends on both the elasticity of substitution between ﬁnal
goods η and the degree of habit formation θ. However, the impact of θ on the markup
μ is minimal and we therefore set η = ε =1 1 . For the habits formation parameter θ,
we use a benchmark value of 0.65, which falls within the range of estimates identiﬁed
in the literature5.H o w e v e r , w e a l l o w θ to vary in the [0,1) interval as we conduct
a sensitivity analysis of our results. Technology shocks are assumed persistent with
persistence parameter ρ =0 .9 and standard deviation σA =0 .009. Finally, we set the










Upon log-linearizing and combining the relevant equilibrium conditions, we obtain a sys-
tem of equations which characterize the dynamics of the economy in the neighbourhood
of the eﬃcient steady state. Firstly, we have the IS curve in terms of habit-adjusted
consumption,







and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) written in terms of producer price
inﬂation,
b πm
t = βEtb πm
t+1 + κ(c mct + b μt), (29)
where κ ≡
(1−αβ)(1−α)
α and it should be remembered that the markup, μt, is constant
under superﬁcial habits such that, b μt =0 . In contrast, when habits are deep, the
dynamic equation describing changes in the markup can be written as,
b μt = μω (b ωt − θβEtb ωt+1) − μωθβσ
³
b Xt − Et b Xt+1
´
, (30)
where the shadow value of producing another unit of a ﬁnal good subject to deep habits
is given by,
b ωt = b Yt − b Xt. (31)
5Macro-based estimates of habits formation of the superﬁcial type range from 0.59 as in Smets and
Wouters (2003) to very high values of 0.98 as reported by Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2005).
For the deep type of habits, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe,
and Uuskula (2008) give a value of 0.86 and 0.85, respectively. Micro-based estimates (see, for example,
Ravina (2007)) are substantially lower, with a range of 0.29-0.5.
6It should be noted that when the habits externality is suﬃciently large this subsidy turns negative
as households’ overconsumption dominates the underproduction associated with the monopolistic com-
petition distortion. The balancing of the two distortions is used as a device by Levine, Pearlman, and
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b Yt − θb Yt−1
´
(32)
b πt = b πm
t + b μt − b μt−1 (33)
c mct = σ b Xt + υb Yt − (1 + υ) b At. (34)
3 Optimal Policy
In this section we consider the nature of optimal monetary policy in response to technol-
ogy shocks, under both cases of commitment and discretion by the monetary authority.
The central bank’s objective function is given by a second order approximation to the







































(δ + υ) b Y 2
t − 2θδb Ytb Yt−1 + θ2δb Y 2









where δ ≡ σ
(1−θβ)(1−θ). The last line was obtained by replacing b Xt with its expression
in terms of output. The weights given to the various elements in the objective function
are derived from basic preference parameters, and the presence of the term in inﬂation
reﬂects the costs of price dispersion due to nominal inertia. It should be noted that this
objective function applies whether or not habits are deep or superﬁcial.
While this welfare measure has the same basic components (output and inﬂation) as
the benchmark New Keynesian model (without externalities due to consumption habits),
this welfare measure looks diﬀerent, in that it does not contain a single “output gap”,
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between output and the ﬂex-price level of output. However,
the more complex term in the current set-up is conceptually similar. The output gap
term in the standard analysis captures the extent to which output deviates from its
eﬃcient level (typically because of nominal inertia, rather than any other distortion).
In a model with external habits, there is an additional externality which means that the
ﬂexible price equilibrium is unlikely to be eﬃcient, such that it is not possible to rewrite
output in gap form. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that minimisation of the terms
in square brackets is equivalent to implementing the social planner’s allocation. In other
words, we are still trading oﬀ inﬂation control against minimising the deviation of the
decentralised equilibrium to that which would be implemented by a benevolent social
planner (see appendix D for the social planner’s problem).
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consumption that must be given up in order to equal welfare in the stochastic economy to
that of the eﬃcient steady state, E
∞ P
t=0
βtu(Xt,N t)=( 1− β)
−1 u
¡
(1 − θ)(1− ξ)C,N
¢
.










where Υ ≡ (1 − β)W +χN
1+υ
1+υ and W ≡ E
∞ P
t=0
βtu(Xt,N t) represents the unconditional
expectation of lifetime utility in the stochastic equilibrium.
3.1 Optimal Policy under Commitment
If the monetary authority can credibly commit to following its policy plans, it then
chooses the policy that maximizes households’ welfare subject to the private sector’s
optimal behaviour, as summarized in equations (28) - (34), and given the exogenous
process for technology (see Appendix F for details of the policy problem under com-
mitment). We analyze the implications of this policy in terms of impulse responses to
exogenous technology shocks.
Optimal policy faces a trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation stabilization in the face
of technology shocks which would not be present with internal habits. With internal
habits, policy would be loosened to ensure the ﬂexible price equilibrium was recreated
without generating any inﬂation (see Amato and Laubach (2004)).7 However, when
habits are external, such that one household does not take account of the impact their
increased consumption has on the utility of others, then with one policy instrument
available, the monetary authority cannot simultaneously ensure output is at its eﬃcient
level and inﬂation is eliminated. Instead, while nominal inertia points to a relaxation of
policy in the face of a positive technology shock to boost output, the consumption exter-
nality suggests that the higher consumption this entails need not be desirable.8 Figure
1 shows that the optimal response of the economy to a positive persistent technology
shock is a positive output gap and an initial decline followed by an increase in inﬂation
(pluses indicate the benchmark calibration with θ =0 .65)w h e nh a b i t sa r es u p e r ﬁcial.
To achieve this outcome, the monetary authority reduces the nominal interest rate
to boost demand to the socially optimal level. Because the policy is expansionary,
we can implicitly say that the ineﬃciency due to price stickiness is dominating in this
case. As the degree of importance of habits increases, inﬂation stabilisation remains the
primary goal and the policy maker suﬀers a widening output gap due to the consumption
7Of course, this is also the case in the New Keynesian model without habits - in the face of technology
shocks, the monetary policy maker can eliminate the output gap without generating inﬂation.
8Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) show how contractionary tax policy can be used for the purpose of
aligning output with the eﬃcient level in response to technology shocks.
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We turn to the case of deep habits in Figure 2. Holding the monetary policy response
constant, we would expect the slackening of monetary policy to increase the discounted
proﬁts of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, encouraging them to cut current markups, generating con-
sumption habits in their goods and thereby widening the output gap further. As a
result, the optimal monetary response does not slacken real interest rates by as much in
order to discourage the reduction in mark-ups. In fact, once the degree of habits passes
a certain level, real interest rates actually rise initially, as policy makers seek to dampen
the initial rise in consumption which imposes an undesirably externality on households.
This can be seen in Figure 2, where pluses depict impulse responses under the bench-
mark value of habits, θ =0 .65, and solid lines the responses under an alternative higher
value of θ =0 .75.
3.2 Optimal Policy with Discretion
The previous sub-section examined policy under commitment. It is well known that
not being able to commit to a time-inconsistent policy can give rise to a stabilisation
bias in the New Keynesian economy whereby policy makers cannot obtain the most
favourable trade-oﬀs between output gap and inﬂation stabilisation.9 In our economy
with a consumption externality, there may be additional sources of stabilisation bias
which make it interesting to assess the importance of having access to a commitment
technology. Appendix F deﬁnes the inputs to the iterative algorithm used to compute
time-consistent policy in Soderlind (1999).
Figure 3 contrasts policy under discretion and commitment when habits are super-
ﬁcial. Aside from failing to exploit the expectational beneﬁts of price level control, the
discretionary policy also fails to achieve the initial relative tightening of policy which
mitigates the generation of undesirable habits eﬀects. The desirability of undertaking
the commitment policy emerges in the signiﬁcantly diﬀerent paths for inﬂation across
commitment and discretion. The welfare cost of not being able to commit to future
policies amounts to 0.016% of steady state consumption and it is 0.77% higher than
under commitment, in the benchmark case of θ =0 .65.
When we undertake the same comparison in the case of deep habits (see Figure 4),
the time inconsistency problem is even more signiﬁcant than in the case of superﬁcial
habits. This is because under deep habits there is a stronger desire to tighten policy
initially in order to prevent an undesirable increase in consumption habits, exacerbated
by the proﬁt-maximising cuts in mark-ups by ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrms. In fact,
under commitment, interest rates actually rise initially if the extent of habits formation
exceeds θ =0 .73. Since such a policy is designed to improve policy trade-oﬀsi nt h e
future, it is not possible to engineer such a monetary tightening under time consistent
9It should be noted that the stabilisation bias can exist in economies which do not contain steady-state
distortions, and are therefore not subject to the familiar inﬂation bias.
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higher under deep habits, where the welfare costs under discretion are 1.98% higher
than commitment, under the benchmark of θ =0 .65.
4 Simple Rules
Having derived the optimal policy under commitment and discretion for our new Key-
nesian economy with either superﬁcial or deep habits, we now turn to consider the
following simple monetary policy rule,
b Rt = φπb πm
t + φyb Y
gap
t + φR b Rt−1.
This is similar to that considered in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), but with some
diﬀerences noted below. b Rt is the nominal interest rate, b πm
t is the rate of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
intermediate goods sector and b Y
gap
t is the log-deviation of output from the level that
would be chosen by the social planner. The choice of inﬂation rate does not matter in
t h ec a s eo fs u p e r ﬁcial habits since consumer and producer price inﬂation are identical in
this case. However, it does make a diﬀerence in the case of deep habits since endogenous
variations in mark-ups in the ﬁnal goods sector induce a time-varying wedge between
the two inﬂation measures. In this case, it is natural to adopt producer price inﬂation
as the inﬂation measure in the rule, since this captures the costs of price dispersion in
social welfare (see Appendix E and the discussion of this point in Kirsanova, Leith, and
Wren-Lewis (2006)).10 We also include a term in the output gap rather than output
itself. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) demonstrate that a term in output plays no role
in an optimally parameterised simple rule, and we wish to assess, in contrast to this
ﬁnding, whether there is a role for policy responding to a measure of the ineﬃciency in
the level of output in an economy with a potentially large consumption externality.
In this section we begin by considering the determinacy properties of our simple rule,
under both forms of habits formation. We then turn to consider the welfare maximising
parameterisation of the rule, and assessing to what extent this can mimic the optimal
policy under commitment described above.
Figure 5 details the determinacy properties of this rule when habits are of the su-
perﬁcial form. Each sub-plot details the combinations of φπ and φy which ensure de-
terminacy (light grey dots), indeterminacy (blanks) and instability (dark grey stars).11
10Furthermore, adopting a rule speciﬁed in terms of CPI inﬂation when habits are of the deep kind
can induce cyclical responses to shocks which are not conducive to mimicing the optimal response to
shocks. These results are available from the authors upon request.
11Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), we write the dynamic model in matrix form as AEtxt+1 =
Bxt where xt is an n × 1 vector of the model’s endogenous and exogenous variables. A and B are
square matrices of size n×n. Let us deﬁne J = A
−1B, m as the number of non-predetermined variables
in x, n − m the number of predetermined variables in x, and q the number of eigenvalues of J that
are greater than one in absolute value, i.e. explosive eigenvalues. If q = m, the system is determinate
(determinacy). In other words the solution to AEtxt+1 = Bxt is unique and converges to the steady
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the rule, φR, while moving down the page increases the extent of habits formation, θ.
Consider the ﬁrst sub-plot in the top left hand corner with φR =0and θ =0 ,w h i c h
re-states the stability properties of the original Taylor rule. Here the importance of the
Taylor principle is revealed as φπ > 1 in combination with a non-negative response to
the output gap is a suﬃcient condition for determinacy. Within this region there is lim-
ited scope for compensating for failing to fulﬁl the Taylor principle through increasing
the positive response of the interest rate to the output gap, and there is slightly greater
scope for using a more aggressive monetary policy response to compensate for a mildly
negative interest rate response to the output gap. It is also interesting to note that a
second region of determinacy exists where the interest rate rule fails to satisfy the Taylor
principle, such that φπ < 1, and the response to the output gap is strongly negative.
This region is not often discussed in the literature, but is mentioned in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). Typically, when monetary policy fails to satisfy the Taylor principle,
inﬂation can be driven by self-fulﬁlling expectations which are validated by monetary
policy. However, when the output gap response is suﬃciently negative there is an addi-
tional destabilising element in policy, which overturns the excessive stability generated
by a passive monetary policy, implying a unique saddlepath where any deviation from
that saddlepath will imply an explosive path for inﬂation.
As we move down the sub-plots in the ﬁrst column of Figure 5 we increase the degree
of superﬁcial habits. This means that the output response to both policy and shocks is
more muted as current consumption is increasingly tied to past levels of consumption.
This has two eﬀects on the determinacy properties of the basic Taylor rule. Firstly, a
rule which satisﬁes the Taylor principle will do so even if the response to the output
gap is increasingly negative. Secondly, the additional instability caused by adopting a
negative interest rate response to the output gap becomes insuﬃcient to move a passive
interest rate rule to a position of determinacy. Accordingly, the importance of the Taylor
principle is enhanced when consumption is subject to superﬁcial habits eﬀects.
As we move across the page from left to right we increase the extent of interest rate
inertia in the rule. In this case, as Woodford (2001) shows, the Taylor principle needs to
be rewritten in terms of the long-run interest rate response to excess inﬂation,
φπ
1−φR > 1.
As a result, the determinacy region in the positive quadrant spreads further into the
adjacent quadrants since a given level of instantaneous policy response to inﬂation φπ
has a far greater long-run eﬀect.
Finally, when we combine superﬁcial habits eﬀects with interest rate inertia, it be-
comes possible to induce instability in our economy when the rule is passive,
φπ
1−φR < 1,
and the interest rate response to the output gap is negative, φy < 0. Essentially, the
state. If q<mthere are an inﬁnite number of solutions to AEtxt+1 = Bxt, the system is therefore
indeterminate (indeterminacy). Ultimately, if q>mt h e r ei sn os o l u t i o nt oAEtxt+1 = Bxt and the
system is unstable (instability).
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perverse policy response to output gaps and inﬂation serves to induce a cumulative
instability in the model.
Figure 6 constructs a similar set of sub-plots when habits are of the deep, rather
than superﬁcial, kind. If the extent of habits formation is relatively low, the deter-
minacy properties of the model are similar to those observed under superﬁcial habits.
However, when the degree of habits formation exceeds θ>0.77, then there are some
signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Firstly, the usual determinacy region in the positive quadrant
disappears and becomes indeterminate. This indeterminacy is linked to the additional
dynamics displayed in the ﬁnal goods sectors, where the markup is time-varying under
deep habits formation. Suppose economic agents expect an increase in inﬂation. Given
an active interest rate rule, φπ > 1, this will give rise to a tightening of monetary policy.
Typically, such a policy would lead to a contraction in aggregate demand, invalidating
the inﬂation expectations. However, in the presence of deep habits, the higher real
interest rates will encourage ﬁnal goods ﬁrms to raise current mark-ups as they dis-
count the lost future sales such price increases would imply more heavily. If the size of
habits eﬀects is suﬃciently large, then this increase in mark-ups can validate the initial
increase in inﬂationary expectations, leading to self-fulﬁlling inﬂationary episodes and
indeterminacy.
Furthermore, the region of instability identiﬁed under superﬁcial habits, becomes
determinate when combined with the excessive stability implied by endogenous mark-
up behaviour, such that the only determinate rule in the presence of a large deep habits
eﬀect is where the rule is passive,
φπ
1−φR < 1, and the policy response to the output gap
is suﬃciently strongly negative.
Optimal Simple Rules Having explored the determinacy properties of the simple
rule described above when embedded in our economy featuring either superﬁcial or deep
habits, we now turn to consider the optimal parameterisation of the rule in each case.12
I nt h ec a s eo fs u p e r ﬁcial habits and under the benchmark value of θ =0 .65,t h eo p t i m a l
simple rule implies a lot of interest rate smoothing, with a strong positive response
to inﬂation but a negative response to the output gap (φπ =1 8 .47, φy = −0.09,a n d
φR =0 .93). With this type of optimal monetary policy rule, the economy’s response to a
technology shock essentially replicates the responses obtained under a full commitment
policy, as shown in Figure 7. To explore the intuition underpinning this result, Figure 8
explores how the optimal policy rule parameters vary with the degree of habits formation,
θ.
In the absence of habits eﬀects, in a New Keynesian economy, a positive technology
shock leads to a decrease in inﬂation and, due to the nominal inertia, an insuﬃciently
12We search across the rule parameter space using the Simplex method employed by the Fminsearch
algorithm in Matlab (see, Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright (1998)) in order to minimise the uncon-
ditional welfare losses associated with the rule.
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demand by reducing the real interest rate. This can be achieved by having a very large
coeﬃcient on inﬂation relative to all other parameters, which essentially allows the simple
policy rule to achieve the ﬂex-price equilibrium with zero inﬂation and a zero output
gap. As we introduce superﬁcial habits eﬀects, in the face of the same shock households
overconsume and the output gap becomes positive suggesting that policy be tightened
rather than relaxed. This trade-oﬀ, which is not present in the model without external
habits, aﬀects the optimal parameterisation of the simple policy rule. Speciﬁcally, as
we increase the degree of habits formation, the optimal parameter on inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
simple rule falls and the extent of interest rate inertia increases. Furthermore, the
negative coeﬃcient on the output gap also falls, eventually turning positive.
A key feature of optimal policy under commitment is price level control where the
optimal policy achieves expectational beneﬁts in seeking to ensure that price level returns
to base following any shock. As the degree of superﬁcial habits formation is increased,
this price level control can be achieved most eﬀectively through a combination of interest
rate inertia and output gap response. Consider the impact of the positive technology
shock depicted in Figure 7. Essentially, the rule is able to maintain a cut in real interest
r a t e s ,e v e nw h e ni n ﬂation is slightly positive (to undo the price level eﬀects of the initial
fall in inﬂation), by responding negatively to the persistent positive output gap and
maintaining that stance for longer by increasing the amount of interest rate inertia.
When the degree of habits formation becomes suﬃciently large, the coeﬃcient on the
output gap becomes positive in order to reduce the initial relaxation of policy, and the
degree of interest rate inertia is increased to ensure price level control.
Figure 9 plots the optimal parameters of the simple rule, when the economy features
an increasing level of deep habits formation.13 When habits are deep there is less of
a desire to cut interest rates initially, to prevent ﬁnal goods ﬁrms’ cutting their mark-
ups and generating even greater consumption externalities. For relatively low levels
of habits, this implies a more muted response to inﬂation and output gaps. However,
there is a surprising ‘blip’ in the optimal parameters for intermediate levels of the deep
habits eﬀect. At intermediate levels of deep habits this desire to tighten policy is ﬁnely
balanced against the need to avoid falls in intermediate goods inﬂation which induces
undesirable increases in price dispersion. Despite the large rule parameters this implies,
the rule still successfully mimics optimal policy under commitment, and the simple rule
in all cases comes close to achieving the welfare levels observed under commitment - see
Figure 10 for an illustration of impulse responses to a technology shock in the case of
θ =0 .5.14
13For very high degrees of habits (exceeding 0.75), we can obtain a determinate rule, lying in the
determinate region identiﬁed in Figure 6. However, welfare is deteriorating relative to commitment
policy.
14More reasonable parameters in the simple rule do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect results in this region of
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In this paper we considered the optimal policy response to technology shocks in a New
Keynesian economy subject to habits eﬀects in consumption. These eﬀects were as-
sumed to be external, such that one household fails to take account of the impact their
consumption behaviour has on other households as each household seeks to ‘catch up
with the Joneses’. This consumption externality needs to be traded-oﬀ against the mon-
etary policy maker’s usual desire to stabilise inﬂation (a trade-oﬀ which would not exist
if habits were internal) and generates a new form of stabilisation bias as time consistent
policy is unable to mimic the initial policy response under commitment. This frame-
work is further enriched by allowing the habits eﬀects to be either superﬁcial (at the
level of the household’s total consumption) or deep (at the level of individual consump-
tion goods). Under deep habits, ﬁrms face dynamic demand curves which imply an
intertemporal dimension to price setting and endogenous mark-up behaviour. This, in
turn, further modiﬁes the optimal policy response to technology shocks when habits are
deep.
In addition to considering optimal policy, we also consider the stabilising proper-
ties of simple rules. We investigate the determinacy properties of such rules and ﬁnd
that superﬁcial habits eﬀects tend to increase the range of parameters consistent with
determinacy, provided the Taylor principle is satisﬁed. However, for suﬃciently large
measures of deep habits (which fall within the range of econometric estimates) the Tay-
lor principle ceases to be either a necessary or suﬃcient condition for determinacy. We
demonstrate that optimally parameterised determinate simple rules can typically come
close to achieving the welfare levels observed under optimal commitment policy. Overall
our work suggests that the choice of internal or external habits eﬀects will have non
trivial implications for optimal policy, even if the implied dynamics of the model when
policy is described by an ad hoc rule could be similar (Kozicki and Tinsley (2002)).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock under optimal commit-
ment policy,i nt h ec a s eo fsuperﬁcial habits: θ =0 .4 (dash lines), θ =0 .65 (benchmark
value, pluses), θ =0 .75 (solid lines).

























































Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock under optimal commit-
ment policy,i nt h ec a s eo fdeep habits, for θ =0 .65 (benchmark value, pluses) and
θ =0 .75 (solid lines).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the case of superﬁcial
habits under optimal policy with commitment (solid lines) and with discretion (dash
lines).

























































Figure 4: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the case of deep habits
under optimal policy with commitment (solid lines) and with discretion (dash lines).
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Figure 5: Determinacy properties of the model with superﬁcial habits, when monetary
policy follows the rule b Rt = φπb πm
t + φyb Y
gap
t + φR b Rt−1: determinacy (light grey dots),
indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
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Figure 6: Determinacy properties of the model with deep habits, when monetary pol-
icy follows the rule b Rt = φπb πm
t + φyb Y
gap
t + φR b Rt−1: determinacy (light grey dots),
indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the model with su-
perﬁcial habits with θ =0 .65, under the optimal Taylor rule (solid lines) and optimal
commitment policy (dash lines).


































Figure 8: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of superﬁcial habits.
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Figure 9: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of deep habits.























































Figure 10: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the model with deep
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A.1 Households
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption bas-





































Utility Maximization The solution to the utility maximization problem is ob-
















t + Ptϑt + Qt,t+1Dk
t+1 − WtNk
t − Dk
t − Φt + Tt
´i
.

















Cit−1di, while under superﬁ-
cial habits it takes the simpler form, ϑt ≡ θCt−1.H o u s e h o l d s t a k e ϑt as given when
maximising utility.

























where Rt = 1
Et[Qt,t+1] is the one-period gross return on nominal riskless bonds.
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1−σ − χN1+υ
1+υ ,t h eﬁrst derivatives are
uX (·)=X−σ and uN (·)=−χNυ.
A.2 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers choose the amount of intermediate inputs to minimize the cost





























1−ε is an aggregate of intermediate goods prices. Proﬁts are
deﬁned as: Φit ≡ PitYit −
R 1
0 PjitYjitdj =( Pit − Pm
it )Yit.
Due to the dynamic nature of the demand they face, ﬁnal goods producers choose
processes for Pit and Yit to maximize the present discounted value of proﬁts, under the



























The ﬁrst order conditions are:












where vit is the Lagrange multiplier on the dynamic demand constraint and represents
the shadow price of producing good i.
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T h ec o s tm i n i m i z a t i o no fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sp r o d u c e r si n v o l v e st h ec h o i c eo fl a b o u r




s.t. AtNjit = Yjit
Costs are subsidized at rate κ, which is determined to ensure that the long-run equilib-
rium of the economy is eﬃcient. The minimization problem implies a labour demand,
Njit =
Yjit
At , and a nominal marginal cost which is the same across all brand producing
ﬁrms, MCt =( 1− κ) Wt
At . Proﬁts are deﬁned as:
Φjit ≡ PjitYjit − (1 − κ)WtNjit = PjitYjit − (1 − κ)Wt
Yjit
At
=( Pjit − MCt)Yjit
The proﬁt maximization is subject to the Calvo-style of price setting behavior where,
with ﬁxed probability (1 − α) each period, a ﬁrm can set its price and with probability α
the ﬁrm keeps the price from the previous period. When a ﬁrm can set the price it does
so in order to maximize the present discounted value of proﬁts, subject to the demand
for its own goods. Proﬁts are discounted by the stochastic discount factor, adjusted for





























































where mct = MCt
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B.1 Aggregation and Symmetry






Yit = AtNjit, ∀j, ∀i
which, upon aggregation across the j ﬁrms, becomes:









dj represents intermediate goods price dispersion in sector i.
With ﬁnal goods producing sectors being symmetric, we can drop the i subscript and





Aggregate Proﬁts: The economy wide proﬁts are given by the aggregate proﬁts













PitYitdi − (1 − κ)WtNt
= PtYt − (1 − κ)WtNt
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where : K1t = uX (t)mctμ−ε






: K2t = uX (t)μ−ε
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The non-stochastic long-run equilibrium is characterized by constant real variables and
nominal variables growing at a constant rate. The equilibrium conditions (36) - (50)
reduce to:
X =( 1− θ)C (51)





ω =[ ( 1− θ)η]
−1 (54)








































1 − αβπε (61)
K2 =
uX μ−εY
1 − αβπε−1 (62)






Table 1 contains the imposed calibration restrictions. We assume values for the
real interest rate, the Frisch labour supply elasticity, the steady state inﬂation, and the
following parameters, σ, η, ε, α, θ,a n dχ. The discount factor β matches the assumed
real rate of interest, β = r−1, while, given the speciﬁcation of the utility function, υ is
the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity,  Nw = 1
υ.
The steady state values of the shadow price ω and the markup μ are given by
equations (54) and (55). The relative price P∗
P can then be obtained from equation (59)
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while equation (58) gives the steady state value of price dispersion ∆ and, from equation












Under the assumption of zero steady state inﬂation (π = πm =1 ), the following long-run















To determine the steady state value of labour, we substitute for X in terms of
Y in (52) and then, using the aggregate production function, we obtain the following
expression,
χNσ+υ [(1 − θ)A]
σ = w, (64)
which can be solved for N. Note that this expression depends on the real wage w,w h i c h
can be obtained from equation (63). However, in order to make the long-run equilibrium
eﬃcient, we impose the condition
w =1− θβ.
This condition is equivalent to setting the cost subsidy κ so as to ensure that the allo-
cation under the decentralized equilibrium (64) matches the social planner’s allocation








. See Appendix D for the social planner’s problem.
Finally, equations (56), (57), and (51) can be solved for aggregate output Y ,c o n -
sumption C and habit-adjusted consumption X.
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Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (36) - (50) around the eﬃcient deterministic
steady state with zero inﬂation gives the following set of equations:
b Xt =( 1− θ)
−1
³
b Ct − θ b Ct−1
´
σ b Xt + υ b Nt = b wt (65)




b Rt − Etb πt+1
´




b μt + θβEtb ωt+1 + θβσ
³
b Xt − Et b Xt+1
´
b Yt = b At + b Nt − b ∆t (66)
b Yt = b Ct
b ∆t = αb ∆t−1
b Pm
t = αb Pm
t−1 +( 1− α) b P∗
t (67)
b P∗
t − b Pt = b K1t − b K2t
where : b K1t =( 1− αβ)
³




b K1t+1 + εb πt+1
i
: b K2t =( 1− αβ)
³




b K2t+1 +( ε − 1)b πt+1
i
Upon substitution of the expressions in b K1t and b K2t, we obtain the following expression
b P∗
t − b Pt = αβEt
³
b P∗
t+1 − b Pt+1
´
+ αβEtb πt+1 +( 1− αβ) c mct (68)
c mct = b wt − b At
b πt = b πm
t + b μt − b μt−1 (69)
b At = ρA b At−1 + εA
t
and, ﬁnally the following deﬁnitions
b πt = b Pt − b Pt−1
b πm
t = b Pm
t − b Pm
t−1
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inﬂation and markup to obtain a New Keynesian Phillips Curve in terms of producer
inﬂation
b πm
t = βEtb πm
t+1 +
∙
(1 − αβ)(1− α)
α
¸
(c mct + b μt),
while the real marginal cost can be re-written as
c mct = σ b Xt + υb Yt − (1 + υ) b At,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h eﬁrst order conditions (65) to substitute for the real wage b wt,
and the production function (66) and the fact that price dispersion in the linear model
is deterministic to write b Nt = b Yt − b At.
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C.1 Households
Habits are “superﬁcial” when they are formed at the level of the aggregate consumption





where household k’s consumption, Ck
t , is an aggregate of a continuum of ﬁnal goods,

















sectional average of consumption.
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption bas-




































1−η is the consumer price index. The overall demand for good











Unlike in the case of deep habits, this demand is not dynamic.
C.2 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers’ cost minimization problem is unchanged. However, the proﬁt
maximization is the typical static problem whereby ﬁrms choose the price to maximize
current proﬁts, Φit =( Pit − Pm
it )Yit, subject to the demand for their good (70) and
under the restriction that all demand be satisﬁed at the chosen price (Cit = Yit).T h e
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η




With a constant markup in the ﬁnal goods sectors, the system of equilibrium conditions
(36) - (50) in appendix B changes along the following dimensions: in a symmetric
equilibrium, producer price inﬂation equals CPI inﬂation, πt = πm
t . W ei m p o s ea
constant markup, μt = μ, in the pricing equation of intermediate goods ﬁrms and we
exclude equations (39) and (40), which are no longer valid under constant markup at
the level of ﬁnal goods producers.
In this setup, we obtain the familiar looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
b πt = βEtb πt+1 + κc mct,κ ≡
(1 − αβ)(1− α)
α
, (71)
to which we add the IS curve,












b Yt − θb Yt−1
´
(73)
c mct = σ b Xt + υb Yt − (1 + υ) b At. (74)
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The subsidy level that ensures an eﬃcient long-run equilibrium is obtained by comparing
the steady state solution of the social planner’s problem with the steady state obtained
in the decentralized equilibrium. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and
all other ineﬃciencies and chooses real allocations that maximize the representative
consumer’s utility subject to the aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production






















The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate
of substitution between labour and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal
















The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as,
χ(N∗)
υ+σ [(1 − θ)A]
σ = A(1 − θβ). (75)
The dynamics of this model are driven by technology shocks to the system of equi-
librium conditions composed of the Euler equation, the resource constraint, and the
evolution of habit-adjusted consumption. In log-linear form, these are:
b X∗






t + b At
´
b Y ∗












which combined yield the following dynamic equation
b Y ∗
t = θβζEtb Y ∗











¢−1 and δ ≡ σ
(1−θβ)(1−θ). In the absence of deep habits, θ =0 ,
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where Xt = Ct−θCt−1 is the habit-adjusted aggregate consumption. Before considering
the elements of the utility function, we need to note the following general result relating
to second order approximations
Yt − Y
Yt









and O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the
bound on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places in




















+ tip + O[2]
where tip represents ‘terms independent of policy’. Using the results above this can be










(1 − σ) b X2
t
¾
+ tip + O[2].








































































































+ tip + O[2].
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(1 + υ) b N2
t
¾
+ tip + O[2]
Now we need to relate the labour input to output and a measure of price dispersion.















Note that in the absence of any sector speciﬁc shocks or heterogeneity, Yit = Yt.I tc a n
be shown (see Woodford (2003), Chapter 6) that
























(1 + υ) b Y 2





+ tip + O[2]































(1 + υ) b Y 2






From the social planner’s problem we know, X
−σ(1 − θβ)=χN
υ such that X
1−σ(1 −
θβ)=( 1− θ)χN
1+υ. If we use the appropriate subsidy to render the steady-state
eﬃcient and the second order approximation to the national accounting identity,
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2 + tip + O[2]






























Note that due to the dynamic nature of the social planner’s problem it is not as straight-
forward to rewrite the welfare function in the usual “gap” form.
E.1 Welfare Measure
















































α , δ ≡ σ
(1−θβ)(1−θ), and u the steady-state level of the momentary
utility. To obtain the above expression we have used the second order approximation
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(δ + υ) b Y 2
t − 2θδb Ytb Yt−1 + θ2δb Y 2






where Ω ≡ χN
1+υ and δ ≡ σ























b Rt + b μt
´
b πm
t = βEtb πm
t+1 − κ1b Yt − κ2b Yt−1 − κ3 b At + κb μt
b μt = γ1βEtb Yt+1 − γ2b Yt − γ3b Yt−1
where
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨









κ2 ≡ κ σθ
1−θ
κ3 ≡ κ(1 + υ)
and
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
γ ≡ μω θ
1−θ
γ1 ≡ γ (θ + σ)
γ2 ≡ γ [1 + θβ + βσ(1 + θ)]
γ3 ≡− γ (1 + θβσ)







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




−(δ + υ) b Y 2
t +2 θδb Ytb Yt−1 − θ2δb Y 2









b Yt − 1




t+1 + b μt+1
¢
− θ
1−θ b Yt−1 + 1
σ
³





t − βb πm




b μt − γ1βb Yt+1 + γ2b Yt + γ3b Yt−1
i
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
The government chooses paths for b Rt, b Yt, b πm
t ,a n db μt.T h e ﬁrst order condition with
respect to the nominal interest rate gives:
−σ−1E0βtςt =0 , ∀t ≥ 0 (76)
which implies that the IS curve is not binding and it can therefore be excluded from
the optimization problem. Once the optimal rules for the other variables have been
obtained, we use the IS curve to determine the path of the nominal interest rate. So,
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




−(δ + υ) b Y 2
t +2 θδb Ytb Yt−1 − θ2δb Y 2







t − βb πm




b μt − γ1βb Yt+1 + γ2b Yt + γ3b Yt−1
i
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.
The ﬁrst order condition for the markup, ˆ μt, gives the relationship between the two
Lagrange multipliers,
νt = κϕt,









The ﬁrst order condition for output is
−Ωδζb Yt+Ωδθb Yt−1+Ω(1 + υ) b At−κ1ϕt−γ2νt+γ1νt−1+βEt
h
Ωδθb Yt+1 − κ2ϕt+1 − γ3νt+1
i
=0
which, after eliminating νt based on the above expression relating Lagrange multipliers


























Under full commitment, the central bank ignores past commitments in the ﬁrst
period by setting pre-existing conditions to zero, ϕ−1 =0 .T oﬁnd the solution, we solve
the system of equations composed of the ﬁrst order conditions, the three constraints,
and the technology shock process.
F.1 Optimal Policy: Discretion
In order to solve the time-consistent policy problem we employ the iterative algorithm
of Soderlind (1999), which follows Currie and Levine (1993) in solving the Bellman













⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
00 −(1 + υ)00
0 θ2δ −θδ 00
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⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
10 0 0 0




00 0 0 β
⎤




⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
ρ 00 0 0
00 10 0





κ3 κ2 κ1 −κ 1
⎤








This completes the description of the required inputs for Soderlind (1999)’s Matlab code
which computes optimal discretionary policy.
49
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1076
July 2009Parameter Value Description
r (1.04)1/4 Real interest rate
σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
η 11.0 Elasticity of substitution across ﬁnal goods
ε 11.0 Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods
α 0.75 Degree of price stickiness
θ 0.65 Degree of habit formation
 Nw 4.0 Frisch labour supply elasticity
χ 3.0 Relative weight on labour in the utility function
π 1G r o s s C P I i n ﬂation rate in steady-state
ρ 0.9 Persistence of exogenous shocks
σA 0.009 Standard deviation of exogenous shocks
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations
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